-the anti-social behaviour order -which is available to the courts in relation to anyone aged 10 or over in England and Wales and aged 16 or over in Scotland. 9 Drug treatment and testing orders will be available in both jurisdictions for those aged 16 or over.
10
There are also provisions relating specifically and exclusively to children and young people. Sections 11-15, dealing with child safety orders and child curfew schemes and notices, relate only to the under 10 year olds; section 16, allowing the removal of truants to designated premises, relates to children and young persons of compulsory school age; parenting orders are triggered when a child or young person is the subject of one of a range of orders or is convicted of an offence. 11 In addition there are provisions relating to the setting up of statutorily based systems to 'process' children and young people who offend: sections 65-66 set up a new system of reprimands and final warnings to replace police cautions, sections 37-42 provide a statutory framework for a youth justice system with services, plans and inter-agency teams, and a national Youth Justice Board is set up by section 41 and schedule 2. 12 Existing provisions for remands and committal of children and young people are amended by sections 97 and 98, the court's ability to take account of the accused's silence at trial is extended down to 10-13 year olds 13 and,
9
By ss 1 and 19, respectively. None of the provisions in the Act relate to Northern Ireland except certain of the provisions abolishing the death penalty for treason and piracy (s 36).
10 ss 61-4 and 89-95 ; schedules 4 and 6.
11 Sections 8-10 deal with parenting orders: section 8(1) lists the relevant orders as a child safety order, an anti-social behaviour order (created by s 1 of the Act) and a sex offender order (created by s 2 of the Act). In addition a parenting order can be triggered by the child failing to comply with a school attendance order under ss 443-444 of the Education Act 1996 (s 8(1)(d) of the Act) and by a criminal conviction (s 8(1)(c) of the Act).
12
The Act also provides time limits within the prosecution process for the under 18 year olds (s 44) and amends the powers of youth courts (ss 47-8).
13 Section 34 of the Act amends s 35 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 by removing the words 'who has attained the age of fourteen years' from s 35(1) and by deleting all of s 35(6).
for those found guilty of offending, the courts will have additional or re-named sentencing options: a reparation order, 14 an action plan order 15 and a detention and training order, 16 together with new sanctions (under sections 72 and 77) for breach of supervision requirements.
On the other hand, very few sections of the Act relate explicitly and exclusively to 'grown-ups'. The abolition, by section 51 and schedule 3, of committal proceedings for indictable only offences relates to 'an adult'; section 99, which inserts a new section into the Criminal Justice Act 1991 and thereby amends powers to release short term prisoners on licence, relates to those 'aged 18 or over' though the new section 34A (5) An excuse culture has developed within the youth justice system. It excuses itself for its inefficiency, and too often excuses the young offenders before it, implying that they cannot help their behaviour because of their social circumstances. Rarely are they confronted with their behaviour and helped to take more personal responsibility for their actions. promoting reintegration into the community, appears to cross the punishment/protection divide. The Hon member for Hertsmere is correct in saying that the paramount consideration is for the care of the child. The orders will also allow consideration of the impact of the child's behaviour, which could be damaging to its victims and to the wider community.
Such behaviour could be damaging to the child, if there was no intervention to stop it. ...
As the trigger for a care order under the clause would be the child's original behaviour followed by the breach of an order made under the Bill, the court would have to have regard to that, as well as to the care of the child. ... The child's welfare would be neglected by our not stopping such behaviour. There are grounds for concern that this might not occur in relation to child safety orders.
Fudging distinctions: the child safety order
On the application of a local authority, the family proceedings court will be able to make a child safety order in relation to children under 10 years of age if one or more of the conditions specified in section 12(3) are fulfilled:
(a) that the child has committed an act which, if he had been aged 10 or over, would have constituted an offence;
(b) that a child safety order is necessary for the purpose of preventing the commission by These are 'fairly wide grounds' 67 and cover conceptually different scenarios. Conditions (a) and (b) reveal the political imperative to 'deal with' an ever younger category of (potentially) offending children. Children over 10 will be liable to reprimands, warnings and criminal proceedings in respect of their offending, the under 10s may instead be the subject of a child safety order if offending (without the mens rea element) is proved (without the child having any right to separate representation) to the satisfaction of the court (on the balance of probabilities).
Conditions (c) and (d) appear to be targeted at the child who, in public spaces, is a nuisance or who is deemed to be in such places at unsuitable hours for a child. The fourth condition is identical in its wording to part of section 1 of the Act. That section provides for anti-social behaviour orders for anyone over 10 years of age and includes a definition of acting in an 'antisocial manner': 'that is to say, in a manner that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress'. 68 In effect, this means that a child safety order, imposed on this condition, amounts to an anti-social order for the under 10s.
67
Mr Clappison, Standing Committee B 7 May 1998 (http://www.parliament.thestationery-office.199798/cmstand/b/st980507/pm/80507s08.htm). The Committee proposed to substitute the following for the first three grounds: 'that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the child's behaviour indicates a serious risk of the child offending after he has attained the age of 10 and that making such an order is in the interests of preventing the child so offending' (amendment 347). That amendment was not pressed to a division.
supervision of a 'responsible officer' who can be a member of a local authority youth offending team (established under section 39) or a social worker in the social services department of a local authority 70 and 'requires the child to comply with such requirements as are so specified'.
71
Those requirements, set out in section 11(5), are any 72 'which the court considers desirable in the interests of -(a) securing that the child receives appropriate care, protection and support and is subject to proper control; or (b) preventing any repetition of the kind of behaviour which led to the child safety order being made'.
The Act, in contrast to the Family Law Act 1996 in section 11(4), does not impose its own welfare test or checklist, and so the welfare of the child will be paramount in proceedings to apply for these orders. 73 The application must be made by a local authority and the child will probably be supervised by a social work trained officer. It may, therefore, be seen as alarmist to view such orders as heralding an Orwellian state. However, this focus on offending to trigger a civil order -without the child-friendly provisions built into the child protection process or the procedural safeguards built into the criminal process -is worrying. For example, applications for child safety orders will not be 'specified proceedings' so a guardian ad litem will not be appointed for the child, nor is the child entitled to separate legal representation (because she is 69 Unless the circumstances are 'exceptional' in which case the maximum is 12 months. 70 ss 11(1)(a) and 11(8).
Section 11(1)(b).
72
Except that s 12(3) specifies that requirements which conflict with the parent's religious beliefs and the child's schooling should be avoided. Childright has commented, is that 'the extra care, protection and support' which a child safety order might give to a child may only be useful 'so long as they are not branded as criminals and excluded from society'. 75 Child safety orders could label and criminalise children to their detriment and bring more children into youth justice and care systems when less draconian responses might be more appropriate. There is no requirement to consider (as in section 1(5) of the Children Act 1989) whether, even if the conditions have been satisfied, it is better for the child not to make an order and so it is not clear how the magistrates' discretion in section 11 (1) ('may make and order') will be exercised.
74
Though it is fair to say that a s 31 order gives the Local Authority parental responsibility for the child (s 33(3)). The potential of the provision for child safety orders is that an instance of actual 'offending' or the risk of such, the failure to 'stay in' between the hours of 9 pm and 6 am as specified by the terms of a curfew notice 80 
The partnership context
This ambiguity as to whether the primary aim is the promotion of the child's welfare or crime prevention is of significance in relation to an important theme in the Act -that of inter-agency partnership. Under section 39 Local Authorities must set up youth offending teams, and probation committees and police and health authorities must cooperate in such provision and in the making of youth justice plans for the area. In practice many such teams already exist, having developed ad hoc over the last decade or so and inter-agency partnerships are routine in child protection work. 81 What undermines government assurances that community protection can be properly pursued without a reduced emphasis on child protection and support is that it has been seen as necessary to set up a new and separate partnership. One suspects that, as with the introduction of community service orders by section 14 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1970, the lack of penological and conceptual clarity is not an accident. The Act can be all things to all people. It appears to legitimate much wider possibilities for victim-offender and community-offender reparation and encourages the sort of inter-disciplinery working that could allow the child to be seen as more than simply an offender.
Yet these provisions sit alongside what is in effect a tariff-based, rather than child-centred, system of reprimands and warnings and alongside civil orders whose requirements for 'detention' in the home could be increasing the dangers to a child. How youth justice professionals and magistrates approach and use these orders and services will be a major determinant of outcome, given the inherent ambivalence in government policy.
The proclaimed commitment of the Labour Party and Government to a two-pronged strategy in relation to young offenders is well known: 'Both research and common sense indicate that there are links between social conditions and crime ... As well as tackling these underlying causes of offending, immediate action can be taken at a local level to reduce crime'. 84 It would be a pity if the immediate action in the provisions of the Crime and Disorder Act 1989 set the tone for professional and magisterial responses to children who offend. Terms such as risk, harm and safety are now ubiquitous concepts deployed in different policy areas but with different meanings and outcomes in each. There is a danger that the Act will contribute to the dominance of particular meanings whereby children's rights and welfare are subsumed in community safety.
If that occurs, then it is doubtful whether the child, in experiencing the potentially restrictive and controlling nature of these new orders, will appreciate that he or she is being 'saved' from a life of depravity.
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Safer communities, safer Britain, n 1 above 8.
